Iraqi opposition needs unified US policy 
Dissidents must be more than mere pressure points

Ghassan al-Atiyyah 
Special to The Daily Star 

LONDON: While almost all Iraqis of whatever social background and ideological
persuasion unanimously endorse change in their country, the supposed vehicle for this
change ­ the Iraqi opposition ­ is too weak to do the job on its own: it still needs outside
backing. 

A glance at Iraq’s modern history shows, in fact, that all political upheavals and military
coups (whether successful or failed) that took place in the country since 1958 were
supported in one way or another by external ­ Arab or foreign ­ circles. 
Iraqis had a chance to effect change in their country after the resounding defeat suffered by
the Saddam Hussein regime in the 1991 Gulf war. The Iraqi people rose against the regime,
and 14 of the 18 Iraqi provinces fell to the insurgents. But the US, influenced by its regional
allies, saw fit to contain the regime rather than topple it; Washington thus made sure that
Baghdad could use its helicopter gunships and special forces to suppress the revolt. 

Washington thus wasted a rare opportunity to effect democratic change in Iraq. In fact, some
of those “allies” were hotbeds of the religious fundamentalism that subsequently spawned
Osama bin Laden and his ilk. 
It might have been understandable, perhaps even excusable, for the Americans to have used
anti-communism as the only yardstick by which to judge their friends in the Middle East in
the Cold War era. But after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many believed that Washington
would adopt democracy as a yardstick. Unfortunately, that was not to be: Washington
preferred to maintain the status quo with all its deficiencies. 
Thanks to Sept. 11 and the subsequent American declaration of “war on terror,” Iraq is once
again in the limelight. 

During the Clinton presidency, the Iraqi opposition became a pawn in the political struggle
between the Democrats and Republicans in Congress, which, in 1998, passed the Iraq
Liberation Act (ILA) designed to topple Saddam. The opposition Iraqi National Congress
(INC) was named as his successor, and a budget was earmarked for the operation. 
 Bill Clinton, then reeling from a series of personal scandals, was forced to endorse the ILA
under pressure from Congress. Yet the former president never did want to involve himself in
a potentially messy change in Baghdad, preferring a policy of containment. Thus even as he
signed the ILA, Clinton was scheming to undermine it. This he did by restricting expenditure
of the ILA budget to propaganda and bureaucratic purposes only ­ a fact that was exploited
to besmirch the reputation of the opposition as a bunch of mercenaries, which in turn
contributed to its divisions, dented its credibility, and led to its losing support. 

When the file on Iraq was reopened after Sept. 11, two main currents came to the fore in
Washington: 
The first, represented mainly by the State Department, calls for continuing with the policies
of the past. Advocates of this line of thinking call for utilizing the global coalition against
terror to achieve the goals previous administrations failed to realize ­ namely, the return of
UN arms inspectors to Baghdad. 

This current doesn’t believe that the Iraqi opposition can form a credible alternative to the
Saddam Hussein regime. General Anthony Zinni, now a prominent State Department
official, said back in 1999 (when he commanded US forces in the Middle East) that an
effectively contained Iraq under Saddam Hussein is infinitely less of a threat than the
confusion of a divided post-Saddam Iraq. 
This current also sees the Iraqi opposition purely as a means of pressure, and has made its
support of the opposition conditional upon the latter’s commitment not to provoke Baghdad
by mounting operations inside Iraq. 

Such a formula suited the two main Kurdish parties ­ the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) ­ as they are outside Baghdad’s control anyway.
For its part, the Iraqi regime didn’t really mind the KDP and PUK having relations with
Washington so long as they were committed not to provoke Baghdad. This state of affairs
created a political agenda specific for the Kurds which is different to that of the other
factions making up the Iraqi opposition. While the Kurds can coexist with the status quo, the
rest of the opposition believes that the continuation of the current situation will spell their
doom. This caused the non-Kurdish pro-American opposition factions to doubt
Washington’s motives. 

The current espoused by the State Department also gives priority to the international
anti-Iraq coalition. Yet in the absence of any serious prospects for Saddam’s ouster, many
countries (regional countries especially) succumbed to the lures of economic cooperation
with Baghdad. This included countries that were once considered hostile to Iraq, such as
Syria, further enhancing the regime’s prospects for survival as well as reflecting negatively
on the status of the Iraqi opposition in those countries. 

This current also uses Saddam’s alleged military strength as a further excuse against direct
US involvement. When the situation in Iraq is compared to that in Afghanistan, advocates of
the State Department line retort that the Iraqi opposition is far from being the Northern
Alliance, and that Saddam’s forces are much stronger than the Taleban. Therefore, they say,
containment ­ with the return of UN weapons inspectors ­ is the best option. 
But what if Saddam Hussein continues to shut out the arms inspectors? US President George
W. Bush says, “he’ll find out.” If Bush meant delivering a blow that would overthrow the
regime, then it would only be logical that Washington changes the way it deals with the Iraqi
opposition, and prepare it to take over in Baghdad once Saddam is overthrown. 

Yet statements made by Secretary of State Colin Powell revealed that the president hasn’t
yet made up his mind over Iraq, which means that Bush doesn’t know what he wants to do.
So how can he expect Saddam to know? There is a second current on Iraq in Washington.
This current can be divided into two wings: the first, represented by the Defense Department,
believes that the destruction of Saddam must be the prime objective. Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld questioned the efficacy of the arms inspection regime by saying on Dec. 2
that “we sent arms inspectors into Iraq for years, but they never found anything important.”
Rumsfeld went on to say that the only way the West knew of the extent of Iraq’s weapons
programs was through Iraqi defectors. 
  But relations between this wing and the Iraqi opposition are limited, because (1) relations
with the opposition are handled by the State Department, and (2) American military
commanders have never been keen supporters of the Iraqi opposition anyway. 

Yet civilian officials at the Pentagon, like Rumsfeld and his deputy Paul Wolfowitz, are very
keen on helping the Iraqi opposition and deposing Saddam. 

Those hawks in Congress who put together the ILA represent the other wing of this line of
thought. On Dec. 5, nine congressmen (including former presidential candidate Sen. John
McCain, former vice-presidential candidate Sen. Joseph Lieberman, the ranking Republican
on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Jesse Helms, Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott,
House International Relations Committee chairman Henry J. Hyde and the ranking
Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee Richard C. Shelby) wrote to Bush asking
him to name Iraq as the next US target in the war on terror. Iraq, they wrote, is still making
weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them. Sanctions have shown
themselves to be useless in isolating the regime, and therefore Saddam has to be removed
sooner rather than later. 

The congressmen’s letter urged the president to make use of the Afghan experience by
cooperating with the Iraqi opposition “in order to minimize (US) casualties and shorten the
conflict.” The letter went on to say: “Again, we can learn from our experience in
Afghanistan. We cannot be drawn into the ethnic politics of any particular nation, but should
find a way to work with all the opposition in a united framework. The Iraqi National
Congress is the only umbrella organization comprising all elements of the Iraqi opposition.
No one group is excluded, and no one group is favored … Let us maximize the likelihood of
a rapid victory by beginning immediately to assist the Iraqi opposition on the ground inside
Iraq by providing them with money and assistance already authorized and appropriated.” 

In order to fulfill what the signatories of the letter called for ­ “no one group is excluded, and
no one group is favored” ­ full use must be made of the lessons of Afghanistan, especially
that of the Bonn conference. 
Iraqi opposition forces which believe in the necessity of cooperation with the United States
not only to overthrow Saddam, but also to help defend a post-Saddam Iraq and restore the
country to economic health, want the Americans to adopt a unified position. The US must
stop using the Iraqi opposition as a pawn in partisan politics. But this will not be possible
unless and until Bush makes up his mind on what to do about Iraq. 
    
Ghassan al-Atiyyah is the Iraqi 
editor of the London-based Malaf Al-Iraqi (or Iraqi File, iraqifile@aol.com) 
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