Middle East Quarterly 
Winter 2002

Jalal Talabani has been president of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK)
since the organization’s founding in 1975. Born in Kelkan in 1933, he
actively participated in the Iraqi Kurdish opposition from the age of 13, 
eventually becoming a central committee member inside the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP).  He worked as a journalist and after the 1958 
revolution commanded an Iraqi army tank unit. When the Kurdish rebellion 
began in 1961, Talabani became an active participant. Following the 1975 
Algiers accords that led to the fall of the rebellion, Talabani split with 
the KDP and founded the PUK. Since the 1991 Kurdish uprising following
the Kuwait war, the PUK has (along with Mas‘ud Barzani’s Kurdistan
Democratic Party of Iraq) controlled parts of northern Iraq; it claims some
4,000 men under arms. This interview, which took place on May 16, 2001, at
Talabani’s office in Sulaymaniyah, Iraq, was conducted by Michael Rubin.

The Future of Iraq

Middle East Quarterly: What will Iraq look like after Saddam Husayn falls?

Jalal Talabani: I don’t see any future for the country except as a democracy.
Democracy is medicine for all diseases. Iraq will not remain united unless it is
democratic, because the social structure of Iraq requires freedom of
expression, equality, and participation by representatives of all Iraqi groups.
This means democracy. Only democracy can offer all these options.
Iraq will not remain united unless it is democratic.

MEQ: Sounds good, but what does this mean in detail?

Talabani: Democracy requires changing the central government not through 
coup d’état, but through the voting booth. It requires freedom of expression,
freedom of belief. It requires multiparty rule, free elections, federalism, the
sharing of authority, and the participation of all in the central government.

MEQ: Do you really see federalism in Iraq’s future?

Talabani: Yes. Looking at the social and national structure of Iraq makes it 
clear that federalism is the best way to achieve democracy.

MEQ: Will Islamists have a leading role in the future of Iraq?

Talabani: No, I don’t see a leading role for the Islamist movements in the
future of Iraq—a significant role but not a leading role.

MEQ: Why not?

Talabani: For several reasons. Start with the social and religious structure of
Iraq, where we find both Muslims and Christians. Islamist movements are
strong among the Shi‘ites and Sunnis of Iraq, but not among the Christians.
The proportion of Shi‘ites in Iraq is not as great as in Iran, so we cannot take
the example of Iran and bring it to Iraq.
Secondly, you have to keep in mind the discouraging experience of Islamist 
movements in the region, such as in Afghanistan, Iran, and (the worst
example) Algeria, where they could not solve the main problems of these 
societies. They failed to deal with national, social, or economic problems. 
They failed to achieve what they had promised.
Thirdly, with threats and problems coming from neighboring countries 
(Jordan, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Iran), we don’t have the luxury
to embark on social experiments of the sort that the Islamists would try.
Fourthly, the cultural heritage of Iraq includes traditions that do not coincide
with the program of the Islamist movements.  For example, there is the
drinking of alcohol, which is of course banned by them. Women’s dress is 
less modest than they demand.  And we have a tradition of more equality 
between men and women than they accept. The cultural heritage of Iraq
includes traditions that do not coincide with the program of the Islamist
movements.
Fifthly, there is a psychological reason. Iraq, from its inception as a state, has
been ruled by the Arab Sunni minority, causing a complex in the other
population elements. There is now a widespread sentiment that one part of the
society must not rule the other parts. This psychological state of the Iraqi
people will not accept replacing Sunni rule with Shi‘ite rule—which is in
effect what having Islamists in power would mean.
Finally, there are powerful and deep-rooted alternative movements in
Iraq—those of the democrats, communists, and nationalists.

MEQ: In all, do you see yourself closer to or further away from your goals
now than ten years ago, right after the Kuwait war?

Talabani: I believe we are closer to achieving our goals.

The Iraqi Opposition

MEQ: Do the best chances for ousting Saddam Husayn and changing the 
government in Iraq lie with those living inside Iraq or with those living
outside it?

Talabani: I feel that real change will occur thanks to the efforts of real people
inside Iraq who live and struggle on the soil of Iraq. Those who live on the
outside can help our work but they cannot effect change on their own.

MEQ: Is unity among the Kurds of Iraq possible? I note the pattern of 
internecine fighting. Most notably, fighting between your Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan in 1996 with Barzani’s Kurdistan Democratic Party allowed
Saddam Husayn to send his troops into northern Iraq. More recently, in
December 2000, the PUK and PKK were fighting.

Talabani: Yes, the political forces and parties in Iraqi Kurdistan can achieve
unity, and for many reasons: Their ultimate interests are identical.They face
the same dangers and risks. The regional plots that pushed some Kurdish
parties against other Kurdish parties are about come to an end. The two main
forces, the PUK and the KDP, know they must establish full cooperation, at
least to attain a minimum common interest. Perhaps the most important
common interest is the implementation of United Nations Security Council
Resolution 986 [“the oil-for-food program”], which is very, very important. 
You must take into consideration that our prosperity here, our reconstruction,
indeed our very life, depend on 986. That is important for the KDP and for the
PUK and it requires that our two organizations coordinate and cooperate.

MEQ: How powerful is the Islamist element among the Kurds?

Talabani: I think there is an exaggeration about the strength of Islamist
movements here. Although officially the Islamist forces are unified, there is in
fact a major division among them. One group is the Islamic Kurdish Union, a
front basically funded by the Ikhwan [Muslim Brethren]. They work quite
cleverly, but calmly; they don’t believe in using force, in using arms and
weapons. The second power is the [more militant] Islamic Unity Movement,
which is not united but in turn has three main splits.

MEQ: Please assess the Iraqi National Congress [INC]. Let me preface this
question by noting that Ahmad Chalabi and the INC have a high standing in 
the United States; in contrast, after living in northern Iraq, I am aware that
many Kurds criticize Chalabi’s lack of experience and his non-residence
inside Iraq.

Talabani: The INC started with great potential. It could have brought together
all the major and minor parties in Iraq. But this did not happen and the
opposition did not remain unified within the INC.

MEQ: Why?

Talabani:  Several reasons. First was the ambiguous American policy. People
initially believed that establishing the INC meant the United States would
take a more active step to bring change to Iraq. But they discovered that the
United States wanted the INC to be just a propaganda organization.
Second, opposition groups could not find consensus—they had different ideas
about how to change the regime. Some were focusing on a military coup.
Others were focusing on armed acts inside [Iraq]. And others believed in 
coordination between officers inside the army and those struggling on the
ground.Finally, the Americans made mistakes. They encouraged one group
against another. They played a game.

MEQ:  Please explain.

Talabani: Take the example of Ahmad Chalabi, whom you already
mentioned. The United States of America proposed that Chalabi be the main
actor—not the leader—in the INC. Then it turned out that Chalabi was not in
complete compliance with CIA policy. In particular, he favored an armed
struggle inside Iraq, and to do this, he wanted to found an INC army; in
contrast, the CIA wanted the INC to look to a military coup and not develop
any kind of military forces to fight against the Iraqi army. He wanted to have 
armored forces and work on the ground against Iraq; they wanted to use the 
INC for propaganda campaigns. So the U.S. government changed its mind
about Chalabi and began to hate him. First he had been beloved inside the
CIA, then he was hated there.

MEQ:  You blame all the INC’s problems on the CIA?

Talabani: Look, Chalabi is a clever man and a real leader of the opposition
against Saddam Husayn. He has dedicated his life to change in Iraq. At the 
same time, he was not someone experienced in politics, having not
participated in any political parties before his founding the INC.

MEQ:  What conclusions do you draw from this?

Talabani: That no single person can lead the Iraqi National Congress; it must
have a collective leadership.

MEQ: Do you see the U.S. government having a role in helping to bring about 
unity among the Kurds of Iraq?

Talabani: Very much so. The United States had a role, has a role, and will
have a role if—and put two lines under that if—if the United States is serious.
If the United States is working seriously, it can do a lot.

Relations with Baghdad

MEQ: What is the state of the current relations between the PUK and the 
Iraqi government?

Talabani: Our relations with the Iraqi government are on two levels.One is for
the necessary relations where we have no choice, for example, dealing with
Baghdad about water, transportation, electricity, trade, and other things
related to the U.N.’s Resolution 986.The other concerns political relations
where—let me be very clear here—there is nothing. There are no grounds for
a political relationship with Baghdad.

MEQ: Why not?

Talabani: For two reasons. First, we insist on democracy, they on dictatorship.
Then there is the matter of the continuous ethnic cleansing policy in the
Kurdish areas under the control of the Iraqi government [whereby Kurds and
other non-Arabs are expelled and their property given to Arabs loyal to the
Ba‘th party]. Take Kirkuk, for example, the Jerusalem of Kurdistan. We
cannot compromise on control of it with the Saddam Husayn regime. And the
other regions—Sinjar, ‘Ayn Zalah, Makhmur, Khanaqin, Badrah, Jassan-are
also Kurdish areas where there is no chance for political negotiation.

MEQ: Saddam Husayn’s ethnic cleansing campaign in the 1980s, called
Anfal, murdered an estimated 182,000 Kurds. Does Saddam Husayn still
pose a threat to the people of northern Iraq?

Talabani: The Iraqi regime does not pose that same threat today that it did
then to people living in this area. The Kurdish uprising is one reason and the
American-British protection of the area is another. The peshmurga [the
Kurdish militia] has good training and fine weapons; it is ready to resist. Our
organization is now much better than in the period of Anfal. The position of
the people is much better because of the [United 
Nations-sponsored] safe haven.

MEQ: An increasingly vocal lobby in America and Europe argues that
hundreds of thousands of Iraqis under Baghdad’s rule are starving because of
the United Nations sanctions imposed on the country. Are sanctions in fact to 
blame?

Talabani: The Iraqi people are suffering because of several factors: the U.N.
sanctions, the dictatorship, and the bureaucratic nature of the U.N. agencies.

MEQ: Do you favor continuing the sanctions or lifting them?

Talabani: When it comes to the matter of sanctions, we are for the lifting of
sanctions on the Iraqi people with the proviso that we continue to get our
share—13 percent—of the oil-for-food revenues that are allocated to northern
Iraq.

MEQ: Is northern Iraq suffering because of the sanctions? Are there starving
children in the areas controlled by the PUK?

Talabani: It’s a mixed picture. We get benefits from the foodstuffs, medicine, and medical instruments permitted in. But there are also problems; for example, we don’t have any blood bags in Kurdistan, plus a lot of other