LIFTING SANCTIONS ON IRAQ: CENTER-SOUTH vs. KURDISTAN

By: Alexander Sternberg
July 25, 2001

According to the Office of the Spokesman for the UN Secretary General (OSSG), under
Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council may call upon Member States to apply
measures not involving the use of armed force in order to maintain or restore international
peace and security. Such measures are commonly referred to as sanctions. The Security
Council has invoked Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to impose sanctions in
fifteen cases.  Iraq is one of those cases.
 

Are Iraqis suffering under sanctions?  Yes. 
 
1. First and foremost, there can be no doubt that under UN sanctions ordinary Iraqis have
been suffering inordinately. This human tragedy is of great concern to Iraqis everywhere
throughout the country, in northern Iraq (Kurdistan) as well as in the center-south (CS). 
Iraqis in one part have friends and relatives in the other part. Notably, there are some
800,000 Kurds in Baghdad, and more live in Kirkuk, Mosul, and elsewhere in the country.
More than one million live in areas under Baghdad control, outside Iraqi Kurdistan. Iraqis
are decent people, and no decent resident of Iraqi Kurdistan glories in the apparent 
advantage they may have over their brothers and sisters in the CS.  All Iraqis suffer under
sanctions, no matter where they live. Some suffer more than others. In comparing the
situation in CS and Kurdistan let's try to "get real", try to step back and take an objective
view, and try not to be easily influenced by the sanitized and biased rhetoric and writings of
those with an agenda who believe it necessary to protect their personal and/or organizational
interests. 
 
 
 Need Iraqis suffer so much under sanctions?  No.
 
2. Kurdistan does receive a higher per capita share of SCR-986 resources, but arguably, its
access to additional resources to support public services is far less than the resources
available to the CS. If Iraqis living in Iraqi Kurdistan under sanctions are better off than
Iraqis living in the CS under sanctions, it needn’t be so.  There is no reason why the situation
in the CS could not be brought up to the same, or above, the level of the situation in Iraqi
Kurdistan. There is no reason why both regions could not be better off together. Both have
access to substantial resources. Quite arguably, the CS has access to more resources than 
does Kurdistan. Most definitely, however, the CS has more options and opportunities, in
addition to substantial resources, to improve the human condition for all Iraqis, not only in
the CS but in Kurdistan as well. Resources are available from more than Iraq’s substantial
public oil wealth being controlled by the international community through the United
Nations under the SCR-986 (oil-for-food) Program. It’s a matter of choice of how to apply
the substantial resources available. Right choices bring right results.
 
3. In any case, and more importantly, never before in the history of Iraq has such a high
amount of the country’s public wealth been dedicated solely to humanitarian goods and
services. Before the events of 1990-91 most of Iraq’s public wealth was allocated to
non-humanitarian and non-productive endeavors, most notably the military and other
security organizations. Before the events of 1990-91, less than 25% of Iraq’s public wealth
was dedicated to non-military or non-security services. Today, more resources are being
earned than even before the events of 1990-91. This is a fact that should be widely known,
but surprisingly isn’t. Most notably, a record-setting 72% of Iraq’s primary source of public
wealth, oil, is designated solely for humanitarian use. An additional 2.2% is designated for
the United Nations to manage and monitor the application of these resources. Thus, an
astonishing nearly 75% of Iraq’s oil wealth under the oil-for-food program is dedicated to
“ordinary” Iraqis. More public and private wealth is also available. Need Iraqis in any part
of the country suffer?  Absolutely, of course, not.
 
 
 Will lifting sanctions improve the lives of Iraqis?  For some, yes.  For some, no.
 
4. Lifting sanctions (presumably to pre-1990 conditions) is too simplistic - a bogus, almost
magical solution to the suffering of the Iraqi people. The shortsighted proponents of lifting
sanctions do not see, or deliberately choose not to see, the crucial importance of the adverse
consequences of doing so. They do not realize that many Iraqis actually fear the lifting of
sanctions. The humanitarian goods and services many Iraqis receive under sanctions would
be stopped, or taken away. Certainly, and most importantly, their personal security would be
more seriously jeopardized than it is today. Many in Iraqi Kurdistan fear that the ravages of
the Anfal would be eventually reinitiated. If sanctions are unconditionally lifted, many more
than those currently struggling, and even risking their lives, to leave the country would seek
to migrate. The victims of the past would become, again, the victims of the future. Are the
proponents of lifting sanctions prepared for this eventuality?
 
5. Proponents of lifting sanctions incredibly state, “the direct cause of the suffering is much
less relevant than ascertaining what can be done to prevent it”.  Oh really?!!  What kind of
gibberish is this? Shouldn’t the solution, what could and should be done about the problem,
be derived from the cause of the problem?  (The proponents must be living on another
planet. What is their real agenda? Who funds them anyway?)
 
 
 Are sanctions the real cause of the suffering of the Iraqi people?  Of course not.
  
6. Children are indeed starving and dying under sanctions. But why is this happening when it
need not? What is the real story? First, let’s examine how apparent facts are used to promote
a hurtful agenda. Let's look at those child mortality figures so often blindly used to support
the argument for lifting sanctions. The often-cited 1999 UNICEF study states that in 1990
the child mortality rate in Kurdistan was 80 per 1,000 live births, and in the CS it was 56.
Pause a simple moment and take a clear look at these two figures. Certainly, these figures
reflect the extensive neglect that Kurdistan was subjected to even before the sanctions began.
Sanctions did not cause the difference back then. Obviously, those who controlled Iraq’s
public oil wealth neither adequately nor equitably applied it. Most importantly, there is
absolutely no reason to expect that such treatment would change if sanctions were to be
unconditionally lifted.
 
7. The UNICEF study points out that in 1999 the child mortality rate significantly rose in
the CS from 56 to 131, and in Kurdistan it slightly decreased, from 80 to 72. The figures for
the CS are indeed bad, but could they really be that bad?!!  Both the CS and Kurdistan were
subjected to the effects of sanctions. Kurdistan was also subjected to an additional embargo 
imposed on it by the CS. Might the data collection process have been tampered with? The
study may have been professionally done as far as the methodology is concerned, but these
results are very suspect, especially when in the CS the data collection process could very
well have been manipulated. Quite noticeably, relatively severe restrictions on journalists
were lifted to allow them to visit the CS soon after the study was released. They observed
exactly what the Baghdad regime wanted them to observe to back up the study’s
conclusions. 
 
8. The study results are further suspect because the 1999 child mortality rate for
Suleimaniyah (59) is significantly lower than the rates for Duhok (82) and Erbil (75). The
general impression was that living conditions were noticeably better in Duhok and Erbil
compared to Suleimaniyah and, thus, the child mortality rates would be expected to be either
about the same in all three governorates, or at least better in Duhok and Erbil. Further,
usually urban child mortality figures are presumably lower than rural figures. But, the
overall Suleimaniyah figure (59) is even lower than the regional urban figure (68). As one
would expect, the regional rural figure is higher (89). The study appears to be a regrettable
case of “garbage-in garbage-out”, meaning that if you process bad data by a good method
you get bad information.
 
 
 With all the resources available, should the child mortality figures be so high?  No.
 
9. Let's look at capacities. Iraq has incredible capacities, both in the CS and in Kurdistan.
Many foreign relief and development workers who arrived in Iraq in 1991-92 easily
observed this. (Compared to the situation today, back then the GOI - Government of Iraq -
was remarkably open to visitors.) Many foreign relief and development practitioners with
more than a decade of field experience in Asia and Africa were amazed and pleased with
what they observed. Though the application of those capacities today is currently under
some constraint, the capacities do exist and they are finding increasingly more and more
expression everyday.  What needs to be done can be done, could be done.
 
10. The constraints did not inhibit substantial reconstruction projects in the CS from being
completed in record time. Even during the past decade under sanctions, there are many solid
examples of accomplishment. The rebuilding of war-destroyed public facilities throughout
the country following the events of 1991 is one obvious, tangible demonstration of what
Iraqis can do for themselves, by themselves, with their own resources. Destroyed bridges in
Baghdad were completely reconstructed during the short period many relief workers were
there. Even a much more difficult suspension bridge was completed within a few short years.
From tangled ruins and piles of debris, factories and refineries were resurrected in weeks to
seemingly full functioning facilities. It was almost miraculous.
 
11. Much of the criticism of the effects of sanctions on the CS ignores the enormous
capacities inherent in Iraq. The criticism also ignores Iraq's colossal wealth in both its land
resources and in its human resources. A simple tour around the country would convince
anyone of average intelligence of this fact. This applies to both the CS and Kurdistan. 
 
12. Too much of the criticism is based on anecdotal information and on selected facts and
statements used out of context without the benefit of on-the-ground visits to the Kurdistan
region. Visitors are restricted by the Baghdad authorities and neighboring countries from
entering Kurdistan. (But they are not restricted once they are inside the Kurdistan Region;
they are free to go anywhere and talk with anyone, without minders.) Many critics who have
visited only Baghdad and a few other places in the CS shepherded by Iraqi minders
misleadingly speak with authority about the whole country. However, what has been
happening in Kurdistan has not been noticed because the Region has not been visited and
was beyond their observation.
 
13. This is all to say that “IF” the GOI decided to develop and implement a policy to reduce
child mortality to pre-1991 levels, it could have been done, and would have been done well,
in a systematic and credible manner. The GOI knows very well and has in its tool box the
means and methods to drastically bring down child mortality figures in an appropriate and
effective manner to levels that would rival those in the West. The capabilities to do this
readily exist in Iraq, and they are proven. The high child mortality figures are not a function
of resource availability; the resources needed have always been available. Iraq does not
belong to the third world. The higher child mortality figures are not a result of inadequate
resource availability. The figures are a function of political will, leadership, and
management. 
 
 
 What are the adverse consequences of lifting sanctions?  A lot.
 
14. Governments opposing sanctions to pursue their own narrow national interests, and
individuals pursuing a mono-dimensional sanctions-lifting goal, no matter how well
meaning, have done a great disservice to the Iraqi people. They have offered credibility and
leverage to what is regarded as the most reckless, ruthless, and bloody regime in the world
today. Look at the documented history of events prior to 1991. Look at the documented
history over the past decade since the 1991 events. In essence: no difference, no change. If
these same governments and NGOs dedicated as much time and effort to trying to move the
GOI to do for its people what any responsible and responsive government should or would
do, ordinary Iraqis would be living much different – unarguably better - lives today. Far
fewer children would have starved and died and the child mortality figures would rival those
of the West. Because of its enormous human and material wealth and inherent productive 
capacities, Iraq would have become a completely different country than it is today if
governments and NGOs moved the GOI to do what really needed to be done.  The fact that
governments and NGOs neglected to do this, or failed in their efforts to do so, raises a
number of questions.
 
15. Iraqi Kurdistan, where some 5,000 communities once flourished, is a land where nearly
4,000 were systematically destroyed and hundreds of thousands of living, breathing people
were displaced. (Today’s quasi-autonomous region of some 40,000 square kilometers, about
half the area of Iraq where Kurds predominate, is about the same size as Switzerland, half
the size of Jordan, four times the size of Lebanon, and larger than Albania, Armenia, or The
Netherlands. The region’s population of more than 3.5 million is about the same as that of
Ireland, New Zealand, Armenia, and Albania.) How can this well documented history not be
so widely known? Many of the destroyed communities were small villages, but there were
also towns of more than 50,000 that were completely decimated. Chemical, perhaps even
biological, weapons were used all across the region, from northern Duhok Governorate
down to the most infamous example of Halabja. How can all this brutal history be ignored
by the anti-sanctionists?! If sanctions are lifted, without security guarantees, and without
guarantees of a fair share of Iraq’s public wealth, it could happen all over again. The real
people involved in the sanctions - the living, breathing people of Iraqi Kurdistan - have no
doubts about this. This uncertainty and fear they always live with. They know they cannot
rely on general declarations of protection and support. Their history of neglect and betrayal
by the world community is long and profound. They have little reason to anticipate the
future to be any different.
 
16. The events of 1990-91 allowed thousands of families to return to their original
homelands and to rebuild their communities.  But in many areas, especially along the border
with Iran, millions of landmines have been laid that threaten the lives of those who return to
reconstruct and resettle in their original homes.  And more landmines have been placed
inland near former Iraqi military installations. Many landmine victims are women and
children working in their fields, gathering firewood, and shepherding their flocks of sheep
and goats. Mine awareness education, demarcation of minefields, and demining, a painfully 
slow process, have been implemented by NGOs since 1992, and by the UN under the
oil-for-food program since 1997. Lifting sanctions would be expected to halt these critically
important activities.
 
 
 Why did senior humanitarian officials resign over the sanctions?  Good question.
 
17. As experienced diplomats and economic development practitioners, UN Humanitarian
Coordinators Denis Halliday and Hans von Sponeck failed to apply the capacities within
their reach - their personal qualifications, experience, talents, wits, their energy - and to
muster the support of the world community through the United Nations, to bear on the GOI
to do what it should do in the humanitarian interests of its people. As international civil
servants and diplomats, the situation called for their unrelenting leadership in negotiating
and persuading the GOI to act in a manner that better served all the people of Iraq. What is 
diplomacy all about anyway? Their mandate had nothing to do with national interests. It was
all about serving the humanitarian interests of the Iraqi people. So is, or should be, the
mandate of the GOI. With the same, identical, unarguable interests, at some point in time
they should have come to terms. It would certainly not have been easy but Halliday and von
Sponeck should have exhausted themselves in trying. They had formidable resources at their
command available within the UN system to make a real difference. Further, enormous
capacities existed within the GOI, and more than sufficient resources were available in Iraq 
itself. Perhaps Halliday and von Sponeck were incapable of exerting the leadership that was
critically needed. Obviously, they were not motivated to try. In any case, Halliday and von
Sponeck failed to provide that leadership and, instead, chose to blame the system they were
assigned to serve. Given their personal qualities and their broad and lengthy professional
qualifications and experience, one can only wonder in bewilderment about their real
agendas. To resign, supposedly on principle, at the tail end of long careers, begs the question
even further.
 
18. In arguing for lifting sanctions, Halliday needs to do his homework much better.  Just
last month he said, “There is no other way to address the problems of the Iraqi people but to
give 100 per cent of the oil revenues back to Iraq and allow Iraq to invest that money in
agriculture, health care and education, to rebuild the infrastructure, water systems, sewerage
systems, electric power, and rebuild its capacity to produce oil and so on.  That is the only
solution to the crisis.”  The fact is that what he asserts needs to happen is actually happening. 
Yes, it could happen better and faster, but it is indeed happening. In any case, though 100%
is not being made available, the nearly 75% allocated to the Iraqi people throughout the
country under the oil-for-food program is higher than any amount in the history of Iraq that
has been made available for humanitarian goods and services. If sanctions were to be lifted
unconditionally, the amount of public wealth available for humanitarian goods and services
would undoubtedly decrease to less than 75%. 
 
 
 Are sufficient resources available to make a real difference in the human condition?  Of
course.
 
19. Let's look at Iraq’s access to resources. First, the oil-for-food program was never
intended to replace GOI resources that were being spent prior to the start of the program in
1997. The program was intended to supplement, not replace, what the GOI had been
spending all along. Few realize that before the program began the GOI had an ongoing
free-food rationing system in the CS for every resident, but not for the residents of Iraqi
Kurdistan. (In late 1991, the GOI withdrew its administration from Iraqi Kurdistan and
separated the region from the rest of the country.) The GOI system worked well, so 
well that their distribution and accounting mechanisms were adopted by the UN and applied
to food being distributed under the oil-for-food program. When the GOI chooses to deliver,
they can very well deliver indeed.
 
20.  Arguably, the CS has much higher access to resources than Kurdistan. The GOI
controls all energy resources and the waters of both major rivers that pass through the
country. The CS always had more options and opportunities than Kurdistan to address the
needs of the people. In addition to Iraq’s enormous oil wealth, the GOI completely controls
the political-economic environment in Iraq. Indeed, the GOI has always been free to develop
and implement policies that would effectively benefit the people, all the people, throughout
the whole country.
 
21. Access to resources has always been readily available. The naïve proponents of lifting
sanctions overlook the fact that an oil-for-food program was offered in 1991, nearly ten
years ago, under SCR-706 and SCR-712, which the GOI rejected. If these resolutions were
implemented, far fewer Iraqis would have suffered to the extent that they have. SCR-986, the
current oil-for-food program was passed by the UN Security Council in April 1995. At first
it was rejected by the GOI, and then finally accepted in May 1996. (But the oil did not begin
to flow until December 1996 and the first goods, food, did not arrive until March 1997.) The
world needed and wanted Iraqi oil, and the Iraqi people needed the world’s goods. There
were, thus, neither internal nor external obstacles to satisfying the humanitarian needs of the
Iraqi people. But six years passed before the world got Iraqi oil and the Iraqi people began to
get a better deal. In the history of Iraq, notably even before sanctions were imposed, there
has never been so much in absolute value, never such a high percentage of public revenue,
dedicated solely to assuage the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people. Where were the
governments and NGOs that promote the lifting of sanctions during those six years when
they were needed to move the GOI to better serve their people?
 
 
 Why is Iraqi Kurdistan seemingly better off?  Good question.
 
22. Many of those calling for the lifting of sanctions still do not realize and appreciate that it
is the GOI, not the UN that is responsible for the procurement of bulk food and medicines for
the whole country, even for Kurdistan. The GOI decides what to buy and who to buy it from.
In theory, the GOI could decide under the oil-for-food program to provide steak and eggs for 
breakfast to every resident every day. In any case, the system works such that based on its
population, each governorate (province) receives an equitable share of food and medicine.
The GOI procures the food and medicine - they negotiate and sign the contracts, not the UN
- and they send Kurdistan its share. While there is widespread criticism of food quality,
though SCR-986 food is tested and what is distributed is declared fit for humanconsumption,
the distribution process is monitored by the UN and works quite well. This means that every
resident in the country, in both the CS and Kurdistan, receives the same kind and amount of
food and has access to the same medicines. Then why is the CS supposedly so much worse
off?  It shouldn’t be.
 
23. Interestingly, the UNICEF representative in Baghdad did not credit the UN presence in
Kurdistan as contributing to the better situation in Kurdistan. She cited the heavy presence of
humanitarian agencies prior to the start of the oil-for-food program in 1997. She also lamely
credits the progress in Kurdistan to the availability of a “cash component”, the use of 
oil-for-food resources to cover some implementation costs. First, this is an uninformed
opinion; it is not an established fact. While the presence of humanitarian agencies was
important and always welcomed, this factor unlikely explains the significant difference in the
child mortality rates between the CS (131) and Kurdistan (72), especially in view of the fact
that the CS had a food rationing system before the oil-for-food program began and Kurdistan
did not. True, there was some food distributed in Kurdistan prior to SCR-986 by WFP and a
few NGOs, but this was limited in quantity, variety, and nutritional value, and made
available to only a limited number of vulnerable persons, and often not on a regular basis.
 
24. Regarding the cash component, this is a highly questionable factor in explaining the
worse situation in the CS compared to Kurdistan. This suggestion ignores the fact that the
CS had resources unavailable to Kurdistan that it could have applied to support SCR-986
implementation. But instead, it chose to apply them to other things. The CS had the
resources and the decisionmaking capacity, and the technical and managerial skills to
substantially reduce child mortality. It is readily apparent that UNICEF’s (and other UN
agencies) delicate relationship with the GOI has been replete with intimidation and
discouragement in dealing with the issue in a forthright manner.
 
25. Regarding the border with Kurdistan being "more porous", give us a break! What planet
do the proponents of lifting sanctions live on? The sanctions have been just as well enforced
against Kurdistan as they have been anywhere else in Iraq. The proponents of lifting
sanctions seem to be ignorant of the fact that prior to the start of SCR-986 in 1997 the GOI
imposed an additional embargo on Kurdistan that severely restricted the availability of
essential commodities including food, and notably cooking and heating fuels, especially
since most families’ incomes were inadequate to meet basic expenses during winter 
months when fuel costs skyrocketed. Even today, in a fuel rich country, the supply of
essential fuels from the CS to Kurdistan is severely limited in quantity and of higher cost.
This one-of-many important and obvious facts seems to have been lost on the
anti-sanctionists.
 
26. All of Iraq's borders are porous: Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, in addition to
Turkey. The CS also has sea access; goods are imported from the Gulf States. The UN buys
laser printer and photocopier cartridges and vehicle spare parts from the local market that are
imported by the CS. High-grade motor oils are available from Saudi Arabia. Most anything
is available including new vehicles and office phone systems from Japan, the latest in
personal computers from Dubai, digital TV receivers from Korea, Sony Playstations and
peanut butter from the United States, food products from Singapore, building materials 
from Spain, beers from everywhere, and most anything from anywhere including Israel and
Kuwait. Much of what's available in Kurdistan comes up from the CS, not from Turkey.
And much of what comes from Turkey goes to the CS, not to Kurdistan. It is wrong to
attribute the situation in Kurdistan being better than in the CS because more goods are
imported through Turkey and Iran. Both the CS and Kurdistan comprise Iraq. But because
the CS is a much larger market, it has more access to goods from more sources than
Kurdistan.
 
 
 Does UN management make a difference?  Yes, to some extent.
 
27. The UN is responsible for managing the SCR-986 program in Iraqi Kurdistan on behalf
of the Government of Iraq. The GOI is responsible for implementing the program in the CS.
The GOI could, in effect, implement the program far more effectively and efficiently than
the UN. They have proven capabilities. (The UN bureaucracy appears non-correctable. It is 
extremely cumbersome and in much need of radical reform and upgrading.) But the GOI
does not apply their capabilities as they could and should.
 
28. Let’s look at the UN operations credited with implementing SCR-986 in Kurdistan.
There are twelve UN Agencies operating in Kurdistan. Two, UNOHCI and UNGCI, are
service agencies; UNOHCI tries to play a coordination role and UNGCI (UN Guards)
provides  a security service to UN agencies. UNGCI is not funded by SCR-986 because the
GOI does not allow it. Neither is UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, funded by SCR-986.
Both UNGCI and UNHCR are funded from donated funds from other sources in the
international community. The other nine UN agencies implement SCR-986 in Kurdistan, not
in the CS: UNCHS (Habitat), UNDP, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNOPS, ITU, FAO, WHO, and
WFP. In the CS, some of these agencies play only an observation (monitoring) role.
 
29. For each of the UN agencies in Kurdistan this is their largest program in the whole
world. For the UN in Iraq alone, the total resources UN agencies are responsible for
overseeing is higher than the resources of the whole UN system in the rest of the world.
SCR-986 is an enormous program that the UN is not capable of handling to the level of
professionalism that is needed. There is no shortage of funds to cover UN expenses in
engaging the best expertise in the world to do what needs to be done. In addition to the 13%
allocated for humanitarian goods and services for Kurdistan, an additional 2.2% is available
solely to cover UN operational costs in all of Iraq. To date, this amounts to approximately
$800 million! This is such an enormous amount that in the earliest phases, when oil sales
were much lower than what they have become today, the UN failed to spend $54 million.
This amount was returned and used solely in the CS.
 
30. Prior to the events of 1990-91, Iraq had arguably the best public service structure in the
Middle East. After the events, the structure remained in place, including in Kurdistan. Many
of the same staff operating in the civil service structure back then are still operating in the
same structure today. It is these thousands of civil service staff in the KRG (Kurdistan
Regional Government) who provide the services that support the UN’s efforts to make the
implementation of SCR-986 in Kurdistan so much better than in the CS. UN agencies are
virtually totally dependent on the regional and local authorities and their staff for the
implementation of SCR-986. Not only has the KRG fully cooperated with UN agencies in
the implementation of SCR-986, but the government has also provided substantial
warehousing and other building facilities, and security, telecommunication, and other
support services.
 
 
 What happens when sanctions are eventually lifted?  Another very good question.
 
31. Though the UN is short term and the existing governing structure is long term, the UN
has adopted policies and procedures that undermine the structure of the regional and local
authorities. The authorities are not sufficiently consulted in the analyses and planning of
project development and implementation. There are three universities in the region, but they
are rarely consulted in research and analysis to support SCR-986 planning and
policymaking. UN agencies tend to perform as if the regional and local  authorities need not
exist. Most strikingly, UN agencies are damaging the structure by hiring away civil service
staff at, according to one UN report, salaries ten to fifty times higher than current market
rates. This seriously undermines the local authorities’ resource base and their capacity to
intervene at the policy, technical, and executive levels. What will happen to public services
when SCR-986 is eventually terminated and UN agencies leave the scene? 
 
32. The naïve proponents of lifting sanctions are obviously ignorant of the fact that the
establishment of the KRG followed the abandonment of the region by deliberate and
voluntary withdrawal of the GOI civil administration in October 1991. The GOI was not
pushed out. The 3.5 million people of Iraqi Kurdistan were left to care for and govern
themselves. Kurdistan faced a militarized separation as if it was a separate, and adversarial,
state. Notably, the GOI imposed an internal embargo that disconnected Kurdistan from the
national electricity network, stopped monthly food rations (before SCR-986), caused 
incalculable financial losses when the 25-dinar currency note was summarily cancelled in
May 1993, prevented high school graduates from attending universities outside the region,
blocked the supply of vital heating and cooking fuels, prohibited the infirm from seeking
specialized medical treatment elsewhere in the country, and stopped salaries and pensions of
tens of thousands of active civil servants and retired government employees. This is
Kurdistan’s post-1991 experience under sanctions! Coupled with the pre-1991 history of
widespread community displacement, destruction, disappearances, and violations of human
rights, the living, breathing people of Iraqi Kurdistan have strong reason to view their future
as uncertain and to feel extremely insecure.
 
 
 Have NGOs made a difference?  Yes, but limited.
 
33. Professor Garfield’s article (New York Times, 13 September 1999) is inaccurate and
misleading. Kurdistan’s borders, as mentioned above, are no more porous than CS borders,
perhaps even less so.  Goods in Kurdistan from Syria do not arrive from Syria, but from the
CS. The impact of NGOs has been important but the extent of their contribution has been
limited. There are not 34 NGOs, but fewer than half this number, and their impact has been
greatly diminished due to limited funding, especially since SCR-986 began in 1997. There
are fewer NGOs in the CS because the GOI imposes conditions that are unacceptable to
them, and because funding is severely limited. 
 
34. Garfield talks of, “A good faith effort to meet basic needs in Iraq would create a better
basis to negotiate an end to the Iraq conflict”. Who is he trying to joke with? Let’s get real
here. Like the others who promote lifting sanctions without sufficiently considering the
adverse consequences of doing so, this is an uninformed opinion that excels in naïveté. He
appears to not know the well-documented history of the region pre- and post-1991 as one of
rampant displacement, disappearance, destruction, and disrupted lives. When the history of
bad faith is sufficiently appreciated, the question of good faith does not arise.
 
 
 Do the people in Iraqi Kurdistan have more access to food produced locally?  No.
 
35. FAO’s statement that the nutritional situation in Kurdistan started to improve in 1994
prior to SCR-986 should not be taken at face value. Their report points out that Kurdistan
has 9% of the land area and nearly 50% of the productive arable land. Let’s look at this a
little closer. How does this translate into better nutrition? Most of Kurdistan’s population
lives in urban areas, not in rural farming communities, and thus does not have direct access
to locally produced food. Thus, most are not food producers. Incomes are severely limited
and people face higher prices on essential goods, like cooking and heating fuels, than in 
the CS. The report does not highlight the destructive provision of free wheat flour under
SCR-986 that, coupled with the recent drought, has actually caused a reduction in food
production in recent years and a lowering of farm income.
 
 
 What’s the conclusion?
 
36. The naïve proponents of lifting sanctions, those who do not sufficiently consider the
adverse consequences of doing so, try to find reasons for Kurdistan being better off than the
CS in selected tangible details such as porous borders and more cash availability. They shy
away from examining the more important intangible causes. The fact is that enormous
resources are available for the whole country, in both the CS and Kurdistan. The difference
lies not in resource availability. The difference lies in resource applicability. And
applicability is a function of political will, leadership, and management. That’s the real
difference between the CS and Kurdistan. How else could you explain the difference when
the CS has many more options than Kurdistan to apply in solving the problems of ALL the
people of Iraq? Naïve proponents of lifting sanctions could be more helpful to the Iraqi
people if they cease trying to find justification in factors that support a regime that behaves
in a manner so harmful to its own people.
 
37. This may all be academic in a couple of months anyway, but this doesn’t mean we
should relax. So-called smart sanctions are under development that are likely to take the
steam out of the naïve proponents’ arguments and result, hopefully, in improving the
economic situation for more and more Iraqis (it’s already happening) while offering
incentives to neighboring countries to effectively enforce a revision in the sanctions regime.
Today’s sanctions are, in effect, destined to soon become the non-sanctions of tomorrow.
Though the system won’t be perfect, and there will be leakage, a substantial amount of
Iraq’s public revenue will likely remain under the control of the international community
operating through the UN.  Iraq is a country of checkpoints but, in a twist, checkpoints are
likely to be established outside the country to inspect GOI imports. The theory sounds good
but, of course, the living, breathing people of Iraqi Kurdistan are much more interested in its
practical application. We shall see.