The Kurdistan Observer www.kurdistanobserver.com Interview With Nasreen Sideek Minister of Reconstruction and Development, Kurdistan Regional Government (Arbil) July 2001     Vol. 3   No. 7  Middle East Intelligence Bulletin By: Micheal Rubin Michael Rubin, a member of the MEIB advisory board and a visiting fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, interviewed Ms. Nasreen Mustafa Sideek regarding the United  Nations-administered oil-for-food program and her ministry's development activities.  This interview was conducted online between Washington and Irbil, Iraq.

Nasreen Mustafa Sideek was born in Baghdad in 1967, and became a political prisoner at age 14. She obtained a Bachelor
of Science degree in architectural engineering at the University of Baghdad in 1991. Fleeing Iraq in the wake of the failed
Kurdish uprising in 1991, Nasreen returned upon the creation of the safe-haven, finding work as an administrative officer for 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. She continued working in various UN capacities in northern Iraq, eventually
becoming head of the United Nations Center for Human Settlements (Habitat) field office in 1997. In 1999, after completing 
a Master's Degree in Public Administration at Harvard University, the Kurdistan Regional Government appointed Nasreen
Minister of Reconstruction and Development.

Many argue that UN Security Council Resolution 986, the so-called "Oil-for-Food program" is hurting 
Iraq, and inhibiting development. Is this the case?

Before SCR 986 my ministry did far less than what we are doing today. Even though we had a large technical staff 
and much heavy machinery, we did not have the funds to address the massive amount of rural reconstruction needed. 
We did what we could with the very limited funds available . . .

SCR-986 brought, and continues to bring, an abundance of resources. Since the program began, more than
20,000 families throughout Iraqi Kurdistan have been provided with accommodation. Hundreds of schools
with thousands of classrooms have been constructed and many more are being planned. Hundreds of kilometers
of village access roads have been completed along with water systems, health centers, irrigation channels, 
veterinary centers, and other works.

What is the scale of reconstruction in northern Iraq? 

To answer that, I'll let the figures speak for themselves (see charts below).

When you discuss reconstruction, is northern Iraq developing from the same baseline as the rest of Iraq?

It must never be overlooked that more than 4,000 of some 5,000 communities were destroyed, flattened, ranging
from small hamlets to towns of more than 50,000 people. Since 1975, many families were forced from their
communities. Our cities have grown excessively because of forced displacement and destruction, and this has 
placed an excessive burden on urban services. Even today, according to a UNCHS (Habitat) report, 23% of 
Iraqi Kurdistan's 3.6 million people are displaced, and many more continue to live in substandard conditions. 
The Arabization of Kurdish areas in Iraqi government-controlled territory continues to force more families into
displacement; more are coming to Iraqi Kurdistan.

Reconstructing these communities and rehabilitating lives is daunting but the abundant 986 resources available 
are helping tremendously. Incidentally, according to UN Office of Iraq Programme Executive Director Benon 
Sevan's recent statement, nearly six billion dollars have been earned to date for Iraqi Kurdistan from both oil
sale proceeds and interest

How does the United Nation balance working with the Kurdistan Regional Government [KRG], which
controls the three northern governorates, and the regime of Saddam Hussein in Baghdad?

A key issue is that UN agencies tend to operate independently of the local authorities. Rather than help strengthen
the regional and local government structures that will continue long after they leave the scene, as the UN generally 
does in virtually all other situations, some UN agencies act as if the KRG need not exist. Some UN agencies take
"managing on behalf of the Iraqi government" too far.

Too much of the planning process has been ad hoc, hit or miss, shopping list project proposals. This is a function 
of funds chasing projects instead of well planned programs and projects chasing funds. We need the UN to assist
the KRG to upgrade region-wide planning capabilities in order to apply available funds more effectively.

Does the Oil-for-Food program in any way hurt the local economy?

What many families in rural areas really need is increased income generating opportunities. SCR-986 has not yet
paid enough attention to this most important aspect of rural development. Agricultural production is indeed
improving under SCR-986 but the fact that the program purchases wheat from Australia and Canada for free 
distribution instead of purchasing locally produced wheat, which is IK's main crop, has had a very negative 
effect on rural incomes.

Also, the UN hires away our staff with salaries of ten to fifty times local salaries, according to an independent 
study commissioned by UNCHS (Habitat) and carried out by the Institute of Social Sciences in The Hague.

The US State Department has recently been pushing so-called smart or targeted sanctions. 
How would smart sanctions impact your work?

The KRG funds projects and runs programs in the public sector that SCR-986 is not doing. For example, the
extensive main road network and the digital telecommunication system that the UN uses to implement 986 
projects and programs were all done by the KRG with its own funds. If smart sanctions severely restricted 
the diesel border trade, which is a primary source of KRG revenue, much of my work on KRG-funded 
projects would not be possible. The running of my ministry would be adversely affected and I might have 
to dismantle administrative structures that would be needed to serve the region well into the future after 
SCR-986 terminated.

However, while the issue of restricting the border will impact the KRG financial capacity to fund its 
projects and run its institutions, there will be more opportunities within 986 for the use of cash 
component to support civil servants and also will allow international investment and international 
contracting capacity to enter the region. This could increase the rate of implementation.

However all the later issues are subject to the approval by the Iraqi government and visas will have to
be granted by the Iraqi government as well. If you consider recent unwillingness of the Iraqi government
to grant visas for those working in electricity and demining, I'm not optimistic all the benefits will materialize.

How has the violent separatist campaign waged by the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey
and its activities in Iraq impacted resettlement in the area?

The PKK presence has prevented resettlement of some areas because they have been a very serious 
threat to security. They have intimidated villagers to leave their communities, caused casualties, destroyed
homes and schools, and looted property. More than 100 such communities have been de-settled by PKK
presence. Only recently have we been able to seriously consider resettling rural areas vacated due to PKK 
presence. 
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