Northern Iraq, Sanctions, and U.S. Iraq Policy 

By Dr Michael Rubin

POLICYWATCH: Analysis of Near East policy from the scholars and associates of THE
WASHINGTON INSTITUTE 
Number Five Hundred and Forty-Three, July 5, 2001 
SPECIAL POLICY FORUM REPORT 

On June 27, 2001, Michael Rubin, a Washington Institute visiting scholar and Carnegie
Council fellow, addressed the Washington Institute''s Policy Forum. Dr. Rubin has just
returned from nine months in northern Iraq, where he taught in the region''s three
universities. The following is a rapporteur''s summary of his remarks. 

Iraq remains at the forefront of U.S. and international attention. Many contentious issues -
such as sanctions, weapons of mass destruction, and the future political disposition of the
country - remain unresolved. In analyzing the source of Iraq''s problems, it is useful to
compare those portions of Iraq under the control of Saddam Hussein to the three northern
governorates (Dahuk, Irbil, Sulaymaniyyah), which are controlled by the Kurdistan
Democratic Party (KDP), the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and the Islamic Unity
Movement of Kurdistan - especially as all parts of Iraq fall under the same set of UN
sanctions. The population in the north is approximately 3.5 million, many of whom are
Kurdish, Turkoman, or Assyrian, and almost 1 million of whom are displaced persons
expelled from Saddam''s portion of Iraq. 

By refusing to grant visas to many journalists, Saddam''s government consistently seeks to
deny press coverage to northern Iraq. Those who do visit Baghdad-controlled Iraq are
restricted to guided tours with Iraqi government minders and are prevented from traveling
into the Kurdish-controlled north. Foreigners visiting the north, however, are able to move
around freely without prearrangement. 

For the past decade, northern Iraq has used the sanctions regime to rebuild a shattered
economy and society. The progress made has been considerable, especially considering that
Saddam''s government destroyed close to five thousand villages in ethnic cleansing
campaigns of the late 1980s. 

Much of the redevelopment has occurred with the help of UN Security Council Resolution
986 - the so-called "oil-for-food" program. Thirteen percent of funds from this program are
specifically allocated to the north, although only about half of the money has been spent thus
far. 

Lessons for U.S. Policy 

Interviews conducted in the north indicate that Iraqis strongly oppose Saddam Hussein and
hope for regime change. However, there is increasing frustration with a perceived lack of
U.S. seriousness toward this end. 

- People in northern Iraq do not believe that the United States is serious about countering
Saddam. Instead, they claim that Washington is "rewarding" Baghdad by proposing to
loosen the sanctions. They believe that Saddam views compromise and negotiation as
weakness and will interpret any liberalization of the sanctions regime as a reward for
previous obstructionism. If the United States were serious about countering Saddam, they
claim, it would make a clear statement condemning his actions and outlining the
consequences. 
 

- Revised sanctions will undermine stability in northern Iraq. Although regional states view
Kurdish autonomy as a threat to stability, the PUK and KDP have for a decade secured their
respective frontiers with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. While the development income of the
northern authorities comes from the oil-for-food program, the PUK and KDP rely on
taxation for administration and civil services like police, teachers, and security. Altering
sanctions to allow Baghdad to bypass the north weakens the PUK and KDP administrations,
which in turn increases the ability of the separatist-terrorist PKK to entrench itself in the
rugged northern Iraqi terrain. 

- Initial local optimism about the Bush administration has waned. Northern Iraqis followed
the U.S. presidential election closely. Although initially more comfortable with Al Gore
because he was a known quantity, many Iraqis were optimistic with the election of George
W. Bush. Many Kurds felt that his experienced team of advisors would not fail to confront
Saddam when the Iraqi president broke his commitments. Indeed, many Iraqis (both in
northern and Saddam-controlled areas) were thrilled with the February 16 bombing of
military installations near Baghdad and later astonished when the Bush administration
seemed to backpedal and reconsider its enforcement of the no-fly zones. 

- Morale in the Iraqi military is extremely low. A variety of sources have indicated that when
U.S. jets flew over Iraqi troops who had encroached into the "safe haven" last December -
surrounding the northern town of Baadre - 138 Iraqi soldiers threw down their weapons and
surrendered without a shot being fired. The Iraqis simply do not want to die for Saddam.
However, they cannot abandon him until an alternative exists. 

- Regime change can only incur through insurrection. People who have served or have
relatives still serving in the Iraqi military discount the possibility of a military coup because
of the tight control exerted over the military by both intelligence and Ba''ath party
functionaries. In order to move any division, the military commander, the Ba''ath Party
commissar, and the intelligence officer all have to sign any order to relocate troops.
Ammunition follows separately. Northern Iraqis insist that low morale on Saddam''s side
makes insurrection a real possibility, so long as outside forces are able to assist with material
and air support. 

- Support for the Iraqi opposition is dependent upon U.S. commitment. At 
present, many northern Iraqi politicians as well as people in the street do not support the
external opposition because they say U.S. support for the Iraqi National Congress (INC) is
half-hearted at best. They argue that change in Iraq has to occur from inside Iraq. If
Washington were to make it clear that it wholeheartedly supported the INC - with the PUK
and the KDP acting as integral members of such an umbrella organization - popular
sentiment toward the INC (or any other opposition group) within northern Iraq could change
significantly. 

- Iraqis view federalism as the most viable alternative for a post-Saddam Iraq. Although
Kurds in Iraq insist that they do not have separatist ambitions (they still observe Iraqi Army
Day, for example), they do say that they will no longer consent to live under a centralized
Arab rule. They also insist that the Shi''is, after more than two decades of Saddam, will
likewise not risk living under centralized Sunni rule. The alternative would be a
confederation of one or two Kurdish/Turkoman, Arab Sunni, and Arab Shi''i provinces, with
oil income divided on the basis of population (as it is under the current oil-for-food
program). Turkey would not be in favor of this kind of reorganization, fearing that a
formalized Kurdish autonomy could have destabilizing regional effects. However, northern
Kurds say they would return to guerilla warfare rather than allow Baghdad to control their
local affairs. Re-imposing a centralized Iraq on the north could therefore undermine stability
and encourage warlordism along the Turkish frontier. 

- When Saddam dies, Iraq need not fall apart. When regime change does occur in Iraq,
fighting will be limited to Baghdad and its environs. If the PUK and KDP are allowed to
continue functioning and are not undermined by smart sanctions or a rollback of the no-fly
zone, the north will remain stable when Saddam falls, although the KDP may try to grab
Sinjar and the PUK Kirkuk from Iraqi government forces. Fighting may occur in
predominantly Shi''i southern Iraq, but this would subside quickly while the real power
struggle occurred in Baghdad. 

This rapporteur''s summary was prepared by Mohamed Abdel Dayem. 

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