Saddam Hussein's Call to the Kurds For Dialogue and the Difficult Kurdish Choice (Washington Kurdish Institute)  Al-Hayat  August 2, 2001  by Ghassan al-Atiyah

Though the contacts of Kurdish leaders, especially Mas'ud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, with
Baghdad were never severed, particularly during the past few years, the Iraqi president
insisted on personally announcing the invitation to the dialogue and chose as the stage for
this scene his meeting with members of the Baghdad-based "Legislative Council of the
Kurdistan Autonomous Region" that was established by the government.

If Saddam met the "Legislative Council" members as the Kurdish people's representatives, so
what does his invitation to the leaders of Kurdistan to a dialogue mean? The safe haven in
northern Iraq was imposed by an international resolution. Yet he says that he has kept "the
special situation" in northern Iraq as it is so that the Kurdish citizen could "reach his genuine
choice", as if the decision to control Kurdistan depends on his will.

The mastermind of the Al-Anfal operation, the displacements, and the repression claimed
credit when he said: "The Kurdish leaders would have inflicted the worst punishment on
their people were it not for their fear of Baghdad." He described Kurdistan as a "despised
small" part and its condition "that of the prodigal son" who has "to back down and repent."
He brandished the club of obedience when he said: "When we cannot do this, then we will
tackle things in due course."

But there are bitter and very realistic facts behind this surrealist and  absurd speech.

Saddam believes that the situation in Kurdistan after10 years has changed  in a way that
allows him to act and impose his political will, if not his direct will.

The international factor as represented by the United Nations is incapable of taking a
decision to intervene in favor of the Kurds in view of the  Russian veto and the Turkish
refusal.

In the absence of a firm US decision to use force directly to bring down  the regime,
Washington has adopted "containment" as its policy. This has  served Saddam more than
any other factor. In the name of the fear from the  (Shiite or Kurdish) alternative, the Iraqi
president has become the least  damaging factor.

In the absence of a possible resolution of the situation on the ground, the US air strikes have
become a media tool that helps Baghdad's ruler gain  regional and international sympathy.

Saddam sought to defuse the Kurds as a force for political change in Iraq. He scored success
in this endeavor, starting with the vacuum created by the decision to withdraw the central
administration and its services from the Kurdish north, thus placing the burden of managing
and feeding the region on others. With Baghdad's encouragement, the political vacuum also
helped turn the political conflict between the Kurdish parties into internecine fighting that
reached a climax in 1996 when one of the parties turned to the Iraqi regime for military aid.

All this happened in full view of Washington, which did not take any action and was content
with observing the Iraqi forces' withdrawal from Irbil after putting an end to the military
presence of the Iraqi opposition there. Washington thus launched a new stage in Kurdistan
that the then US Secretary of State Madeline Albright consolidated when she told the Kurds:
"Do not challenge Saddam and provoke him to attack in return for continuing the air
protection."

With the central government absent, Iraq's Kurdistan was seen as a vacuum that both Iran
and Turkey, and Syria to a lesser degree, sought to fill. This gave Baghdad the opportunity
to join the balance of powers' game by backing one party against another. The Kurds'
preoccupation with protecting themselves from Iran and/or Turkey compelled them to make
concessions and live in constant anxiety.When the two main Kurdish parties overcame many
of their differences, Baghdad turned to secondary parties to stoke up the conflicts. It helped 
the Kurdish Workers Party and other marginal groups and also resorted to terrorism and
explosions (a Tunisian UN employee was recently arrested on the charge of transporting
explosives in a UN truck).

The growing danger that the Kurdish Islamic parties posed to the two main Kurdish parties
also served Baghdad.

But the oil and financial card remained the most effective one in neutralizing the Kurds. The
regime has again linked the region to an economic network whose main activity is oil and
smuggling. The Kurdish economy today, especially in Irbil, relies on the trade and oil
transport routes to Turkey through Kurdistan. This has created Kurdish sectors that are
benefiting from this situation and it is difficult to compensate them for the Iraqi
Government's supplies. Baghdad also succeeded in building bridges of cooperation with
Turkey and hinted at opening a second crossing point that does not go through the Kurdish
area.

With this background, Saddam's initiative becomes more of a threat than a dialogue. Yet the
Kurds are not in a position to reject the invitation.

The Kurdish predicament is represented by the fear of a confrontation with Saddam without
a regional or international cover to protect them. Their response came in a very moderate
statement. The two main Kurdish parties underlined in a joint statement dated 27 July their
peaceful path and Iraq's national unity "which will be consolidated in as much as democracy, 
pluralism, respect for human rights, and the peaceful and fair solution of the Kurdish issue
within the framework of a united and sovereign Iraq are achieved." Regarding the conditions
for the dialogue, the statement merely referred to the "need to prepare the appropriate
grounds and the requirements for the democratic and open dialogue and to establish
confidence building measures." It specified these requirements as "ending the policy of
deporting and displacing the indigenous population from their areas and disclosing the fate
of detainees and missing persons. The sacrifices, aspirations, and will of the people of
Kurdistan should also be taken into consideration in accordance with the resolution of the
Iraqi Kurdistan National Assembly of 4 October 1992 that says the legal relationship
between the region of Kurdistan and the central government should be based on federalism
and respect for the legitimate rights of all ethnic groups and religions."

The statement talks here about "taking into consideration" and not commitment to or the
actual implementation of the Kurdish National Assembly's decisions while stressing "Iraq's
unity and sovereignty." The reference to "respect for the legitimate rights of all ethnic groups
and religions" was included to assure the Turkomen and Assyrians.

On the other hand, the statement avoided linking the Kurdish issue to the Iraqi opposition or
even to refer to the latter in any way. It also dropped the international factor by not
demanding an international participation or supervision to guarantee the democratic
transition process. The statement totally ignored all the UN resolutions, including Resolution
688 that deals with the Kurds' human rights.

It is quite noticeable that, according to informed sources, the first draft of the statement
included several conditions, the most important of which were: "The Baghdad Government's
acceptance of the federal system declared by the Kurdish Parliament in April 1992; the
launch of a dialogue on the basis of establishing a democratic and pluralistic regime; and the
holding of general elections under regional and international supervision to ensure the
honesty of the electoral process." Another condition called on the government "to disclose
the fate of the victims of the 1988 Al-Anfal operation when it arrested more than 150,000
Kurds and moved them from their areas in northern Iraq to unknown destinations."

The moderation of the joint statement and its focus on what is possible within the limits of
the common Iraqi will has left the ball in the central government's corner. If Saddam's call to
a dialogue was merely a card for the consumption of the Arab and international media, then
the moderation of the Kurdish response has rendered it useless. If the Baghdad ruler's aim 
from using the language of threat encased in the call to a dialogue was to ensure the Kurdish
leaders' rejection or to provoke them so as to justify an invasion of Kurdistan, then the
Kurdish moderation has also rendered this excuse useless.

The Iraqi president's need for a "Trojan horse" to re-impose his control on Kurdistan might
have prompted him to propose a plan with which he had hoped to split the Kurds' ranks. But
the issuance of the joint statement that left the door open for a dialogue has rendered this
possibility useless too.

Saddam's initiative might however achieve with the Iraqi opposition what it has failed to
achieve with the Kurds, especially when non-Kurdish Iraqi opposition elements attack the
Kurds for "the dialogue" with the regime. This only increases the Iraqi opposition's divisions
and reinforces the Kurds' conviction of its futility.

The Kurds have gained some time but the problem of the Kurdish future remains. Kurdish
leaders know that the current situation, which has continued for 10 years (and is the best for
several decades), cannot remain like that forever and that the fate of Kurdistan will in the
end be decided, either positively or negatively, in Baghdad.

The Kurdish leaders also realize at the same time that they are incapable of and not allowed
to impose the change in Baghdad and that there is no effective Iraqi opposition that is
acceptable at the regional and international levels on which it is possible to wager or forge an
alliance with. Besides the Kurds, the Islamic number in the equation (specifically the Shiite
one) remains the stronger one. But the problem is that this number is unacceptable at the
regional and international levels and its policies on the Kurdish affair are not assuring to
most Kurds.

Apart from Libya, there is not a single Arab country that is sympathetic to the Kurds'
aspirations and hopes. The Arab street too sees only a secessionist movement in the Kurds.
At the regional level, no neighboring country (Turkey, Iran, Syria) wishes to see a
sophisticated Kurdish example established that would attract the Kurds in their countries.

The Kurds fear being abandoned by the United States as much as they understand the
importance of its protection of their existence. The events of 1975 are still vivid in the
Kurdish leaders' memories, especially Barzani. The Kurds' fears are growing today as the US
administration is reviewing its policy toward Iraq, particularly in connection with continuing
the no fly zones as its planes are coming under more Iraqi challenge there. The most that the
Pentagon promised at the last meeting held with the Kurds on 14 July was that Washington
"will not allow Saddam to use Iraqi air space to attack the Kurds or threaten his neighbors."

Protection from Saddam's aircraft is not a substitute and not enough to protect the Kurds
from a military invasion on the ground. Washington's failure to assure the Kurds about their
future is not just a political defeat for US policy but also the end of the Kurdish democratic
experiment and is, consequently, a victory for the dictatorship and for Saddam personally.

In return, Saddam is not willing to make any political concession, not even a temporary one,
for the sake of democratic détente in Iraq, especially after having come out of "political
healthcare unit" and the "cage" of US containment.

Finally, no one knows Saddam's promises better than the Kurds. They have been bitten
several times and they therefore need international guarantees. But Saddam does not accept
this, arguing that it is a matter of "sovereignty." Nor the party that is most capable of
providing the guarantees is willing to do so for fear that this would rehabilitate the regime.
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