Turkey should stay out of Iraq
Ferruh Demirmen 
7 December 2001
Turkish Daily News 

Turkey is faced with crucial foreign-issue problems these days, including its stance vis-a-vis
with its neighbor Iraq in the event of a U.S., military operation against that country.
Although the U.S. claims it has no immediate plans to strike Iraq, it has also made clear that
the option is very much on the table. The hawkish tone of President Bush's remarks about
Iraq and his revival recently of the United Nations (U.N.) arms embargo issue with Iraq -- a
subject long dormant in public memory -- leave little doubt that Bush would like to widen
the fight against terrorism to Iraq. If he were to do that, Bush would have overwhelming 
support from the American public.

The problem the U.S. faces is that its European allies have little enthusiasm for an operation
against Iraq. They think the U.N., embargo issue has reached a dead-end, and consider the
evidence linking Iraq's Saddam Hussein to the Al-Qaida network unconvincing. The Arab
countries are also opposed. Such meager international support would not necessarily deter
Bush from attacking Iraq, although obviously he would like to have broader international
support for his Iraq policy.

In this context, Turkey's support would be crucial. Unlike during the Gulf War, when the
U.S., had the freedom to hit Iraq both from the south and the north, this time military
operations against Iraq, especially on the ground, must be conducted primarily from the
north, i.e. Turkey. Bush, therefore, would very much like to have Turkey's help in a possible
U.S., strike against Iraq. Bush will undoubtedly also count on the assistance of Iraqi
opposition forces within Iraq, but based on past experience, such assistance might not be
very useful.

Turkey has taken the position that it is opposed to widening the war on terrorism to Iraq. On
the occasion of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell's recent visit to Turkey, President
Ahmet Sezer repeated Turkey's concern on this issue. Such statements notwithstanding,
however, the government has also projected an image of being irresolute on the issue. Of
late, we have heard ruminations, first from Turkey's ambassador to Washington Faruk
Logoglu and later from Defense Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu, that Turkey would be
flexible on its Iraq policy and could drop its objections to a U.S., attack on its neighbor "if
circumstances changed."

What do the seemingly contradictory statements signify? As one possibility, remarks by
Logoglu and Cakmakoglu could be intended as trial balloons to test public's reaction to
Turkey joining hands with the U.S., in a move against Iraq. Another explanation is that the
Turkish leadership is split on the Iraq issue, with no clear-cut consensus. A more plausible
explanation, strengthened by a fresh (Dec. 5) news item in TDN, is that the government,
while in principle opposed to an operation against Iraq, would be willing to change its stand
and support such operation if so asked by the U.S.

Whatever the explanation, it is not a reassuring situation. A policy based on posturing,
vacillation or equivocation, whatever one might call it, is not the way to conduct foreign
policy. A firm stand is what is needed.

This brings us to a core question: If the U.S., were to move against Iraq to depose Saddam,
should Turkey support such an operation?

The answer to this question should depend on what "support" means. If by "support" it is
meant Turkish troops joining the operation alongside the U.S., troops, the answer should be
a definite "no." There are many reasons why Turkey should not actively join in a hostile act
against Iraq. First, Iraq is already weakened internally by ethnic and sectarian strife, and the
operation would likely result in political partitioning of the country. This could give rise to
the establishment of an autonomous or semi-independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq,
giving fuel to the separatist aims of Kurdish guerillas active on either side of the border. 
Turkey's unity would be threatened.

Second, a large-scale military operation would bring the already crisis-ridden Turkish
economy to a screeching halt. Third, it would hurt Turkey's relations with its neighbors and
the Arab world. Relations with the European countries would probably also be affected,
undermining the country's efforts to join EU. And of course, Saddam's arsenal of chemical
and biological weapons is something to consider.

Lastly, Kemal Ataturk's "peace at home, peace in the world" guiding principle has served the
Turkish republic well, and there is no reason why it should not continue doing so. Turkey
does not need additional territory, and it has enough problems to deal with at home.
All considered, an act of war by Turkey against Iraq in concert with the U.S., would be an
adventure laden with imponderables and perils.

And for those who would fantasize on putative gains from the war, that Turkey could walk
away from such adventure with rich oil fields in northern Iraq, it is well to bring home the
sobering fact that oil wealth alone is not sufficient to make a nation rich. Many a nation rich
in oil have squandered their oil wealth, and many still do. Turkey has plenty of oil and gas
resources in its neighborhood. What it needs, more than indigenous oil and gas, are political,
fiscal and economic reforms that encourage productivity, trade and transparency and
eliminate opportunism, graft and corruption. A reduced rate of population growth would
also help.

That said, Turkey may find sufficient justification to "support" a U.S.,-led attack of Iraq if
that would mean making its ground and air infrastructure available for such operation. This
would be support similar to the one given during the Gulf War, but with some caveats
attached. In considering such support, Turkey should weigh the strength of evidence linking
Saddam to the Al-Qaida network, and receive assurances from the U.S., that it would not --
as it did during the Gulf War -- suffer adverse political and financial consequences as a
result of the operation. That would mean, firstly, Iraq remaining politically intact in the
aftermath of the operation and security risks across the border minimized. It would also
mean Turkey receiving compensation for financial losses from lost trade with Iraq.

Whether the U.S., can actually deliver on such promises, however, is a different matter. The
American public has a short memory in matters foreign, and there are voices in the U.S.,
policy establishment that advocate the establishment of a pliant Kurdish state in northern
Iraq. The economy is also in recession, limiting severely the ability of the U.S., to be
generous. Turkey has a hard choice to make.

ferruh@demirmen.com
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